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This study explores the relationship between collective memory, delegitimiza-
tion of the rival, and personal experiences, on the one hand, and personal and
collective fear and hope, on the other hand, in the context of the Israeli-Arab
conflict. A questionnaire was administered to 217 Israeli-Jewish undergradu-
ates from three academic institutions in Israel. The dependent variables were
levels of fear and hope on a personal and collective level, whereas the inde-
pendent variables were collective memory of the Jewish past, delegitimization
of Arabs, and the personal experiences of contact with Arabs, military service
in the occupied territories, close relationships to a terror victim, and family
relationships with Holocaust survivors. Results show that (a) delegitimization
of Arabs has the highest correlations with fear and hope, personally as well as
collectively; and (b) the centrality of Jewish collective memory is directly
related to levels of collective fear. In addition, we found a combined interac-
tion effect of collective memory and personal contact with Arabs on fear,
and of collective memory with political orientation and various elements of life
experience on hope. Hence, it seems, that the level of centrality of collective
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8memory serves to moderate the influence of conflict-related life experiences on
personal and collective fear and hope.
Intractable conflicts are prevalent worldwide, and in all of them emotions
play an important role (Bar-Tal, 2007b). Some of these emotions fuel the
conflict and prevent its peaceful resolution, whereas others are necessary
to embark on the road of peace. In the first category, fear is a central emo-
tion, whereas in the other, hope best symbolizes the attempt to change and
opt for peace. The study of these emotions, hence, is of major importance in
the understanding of the psychological forces that energize conflict and mot-
ivate its resolution.
Whereas the major thrust of emotion research has been in the individual
context (see Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2004), this study attempts to elucidate
some of the antecedents to fear and hope in the situation of conflict both on
the individual and on the collective level. Specifically, in this study we
explore the influence of a few main variables such as collective memory,
delegitimization of the rival, and personal experiences on the evolution of
collective and personal fear and hope in the context of the Israeli-Arab
conflict.
FEAR AND HOPE
Fear is usually defined as a discrete subjective aversive emotion that arises in
situations of perceived threat or danger to a person or his or her society that
enables the person to respond adaptively (Gray, 1987; Ohman, 1993). It is
frequently accompanied by a perception of relative weakness and low cop-
ing potential with the threatening event (Roseman, 1984). Threats and dan-
gers, present or anticipated, vary greatly; but in cases of conflict, they
usually relate to personal and collective experiences determined by the nat-
ure of the conflict (e.g., war, terror attack, persecutions, economic
depression, or imprisonment). Frequently, fear can be induced by infor-
mation received about certain objects, events, peoples, or situations that
are capable of threatening the person or his or her society (see Grings &
Dawson, 1978; Rachman, 1978). Although reactions of fear may also be
aroused through a conscious appraisal of a situation, often they are acti-
vated and processed automatically: Danger, in such cases, is dealt with in
a routine way, without reflection or conscious reference to experience and
stored memories (LeDoux, 1996).
Hope is an integrated reaction that consists of cognitive elements, includ-
ing expecting and planning a positive occurrence with positive affect
(Snyder, 1994, 2000; Staats & Stassen, 1985). As a complex syndrome, hope
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8has not been associated with any specific physiological response leading to
specific and concrete forms of behavior. Hope is based on higher cognitive
processing and requires setting goals; planning how to achieve them; use of
imagery, creativity, cognitive flexibility, mental exploration of novel
situations, and even risk taking (Breznitz, 1986; Clore, Schwartz, &
Conway, 1994; Fromm, 1968; Isen, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Snyder, 1994,
2000). Hope arises when a concrete positive goal is expected (Stotland,
1969), including yearning for relief from negative conditions (Lazarus,
1991), in our case, when signs of a possible ending of the conflict appear.
Emotions like fear and hope not only characterize individuals but collec-
tives as well (de Rivera, 1992; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). A collective
emotional orientation occurs as a result of particular societal conditions,
common experiences, shared norms, and socialization processes (Kitayama
& Markus, 1994). Persons thus may experience emotions as a result of their
membership in a certain group or society (Smith, 1993). Collective emotions
have been defined, in a relatively general way, as emotions that are shared
by large numbers of individuals in a certain society and are targeted at
generalized out-groups or group-related events (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de
Rivera, 2007; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).
A number of scholars have pointed to the important behavioral implica-
tions of collective or group-based emotions in situations of conflict between
groups and societies (e.g., see Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, in press; Petersen,
2002; Volkan, 1997). We propose that in contrast to individual emotions,
which are related to unique personal experiences, collective or group-based
emotions are solely formed as a consequence of collective experiences in a
particular societal context (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Gordon, 1990; Kitayama
& Markus, 1994). The societal context provides signals and cues that, when
perceived and cognized by individuals and collectives, create the psychologi-
cal conditions that become an inherent part of the societal environment
(Bar-Tal & Sharvit, in press). Human beings appraise a context as being
threatening, harmonious, peaceful, and so forth; in turn, the appraisal trig-
gers thoughts, attitudes, and emotions that then lead to various lines of
behavior (see Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
The social context can signal potential events related to personal or col-
lective experiences. For example, in a threatening context, a person may be
fearful that a terror attack will hurt him or her or that he or she may be fear-
ful that a war will harm his or her society. Recent studies have pointed to the
different impact of personal and collective threats in reactions to conflict
events (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002; Huddy, Feldman,
Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Jacobson & Bar-Tal, 1995). Those interesting find-
ings call for intensive research that focuses on the distinct phenomena affect-
ing the emergence of personal vis-a `-vis collective fear and hope.
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8It is possible to point to at least three categories of variables that influ-
ence fear and hope in the context of conflict. The first category relates to
the collective memory, generally defined as representations of the past that
are remembered by society members as the history of the group (Kansteiner,
2002). Collective memory is treated by society members as a truthful
account of the past; and formal institutions, including state schools, impart
it to society members. When the collective memory of a society focuses on
past traumas and other negative experiences, it is possible to assume that
when they relate present events to past experiences, society members are
prone to experience fear (Volkan, 1997).
Second, fear and hope in conflict are determined also on the basis of
society members’ perception of the rival. In line with the Integrated Threat
Theory of Stephan and Stephan (2000), we may assume that in conflict
situations the rival group poses considerable threat, leading to fear. There
is ample evidence that in conflict the rival group is viewed extremely
negatively, in delegitimizing terms, and as a threatening entity (Bar-Tal &
Teichman, 2005; Kelman, 1987).
Third, fear and hope in a conflict context are directly related to society
members’ specific personal experiences. For example, a person who either
was hurt or has a relative who was hurt in the intergroup conflict is likely
to experience more fear than someone who has been spared such personal
experience (Bar-Tal, 1991).
THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT
This research was conducted with regard to the Jewish society in Israel in the
context of the active Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is part of a more gen-
eral Israeli–Arab conflict. Going on for about a century, the latter
developed about the territory that two national movements claimed as their
homeland: Palestinian nationalism and Zionism clashed recurrently over the
right for self-determination, statehood, and justice. Since 1948, the neigh-
boring Arab countries also became implicated in the conflict, but at present
it is mainly the Jewish Israelis and the Palestinians who, with the exception
of a short engagement in a peace process in the 1990s, continue the violent
confrontations. From the Jewish-Israeli perspective, the conflict continu-
ously poses serious collective danger to the existence of the Jewish state,
and on a personal level it threatens its population (Arian, 1995; Bar-Tal,
2007a). However, since Egyptian President Sadat visited Jerusalem in
1977, a gesture of goodwill that led to the signing of the peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel in 1979, and since the peace process between
the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians in the 1990s, hope also became a major
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8force in the Jewish-Israeli emotional repertoire. In the 2000s, since the
eruption of the second Palestinian uprising, the Al Aqsa Intifada, with the
escalation of violence and the cessation of the peace process, a sense of
threat again became dominant in Israeli society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2007).
Research found that fear reduces Israelis’ willingness to compromise to
reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians and solve the conflict peace-
fully, whereas hope increases this readiness (Arian, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2007a;
Gordon & Arian, 2001; Maoz & McCauley, 2005).
THIS STUDY
This study was designed to explore the relations between various factors and
fear and hope among Israeli Jews. Each of these variables is briefly discussed
in the following.
Collective Memory
A central part of the analysis is devoted to collective memory, which seems
of major importance in intractable conflicts. By and large, the Israeli collec-
tive memory is deeply marked by the hostile approach of the world toward
the Jews. Jewish history shows that from the destruction of the Second
Temple and the beginning of the forced exile in the Roman era, through
the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution, up to
the present time, Jews, in almost every place they lived, have consistently
and continuously been subject to what is now called anti-Semitism. Through
this long history they experienced persecution, libel, social taxation, restric-
tion, forced conversion, expulsion, and pogroms (e.g., Grosser & Halperin,
1979; Poliakov, 1974). As a result, as Liebman (1978) rightly pointed out,
‘‘Jewish tradition finds anti-Semitism to be the norm, the natural response
of the non-Jew.... The term ‘Esau hates Jacob’ symbolizes the world which
Jews experience. It is deeply embedded in the Jewish folk tradition’’ (p. 45).
However, the climax of these experiences took place in the 20th century
with the Nazis’ ‘‘final solution to the Jewish problem,’’ the systematic geno-
cide that we now call the Holocaust (see Dawidowicz, 1975). The fact that
six million Jews perished while the world remained indifferent (e.g., Morse,
1968) tragically and crucially confirmed the Jewish traumatic collective
memory (Segev, 2000; Zafran & Bar-Tal, 2003).
Israeli society can, therefore, be characterized by its siege mentality,
which is based on a prevailing belief that Jewish society is alone in a hostile
world (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992). This perception constitutes a significant
part of the Israeli ethos (see Arian, 1995; Gertz, 1995; Liebman &
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8Don-Yehiya, 1983), and as such it obviously affects the perception of the
Israeli-Arab conflict and its resolution. For example, studies show that Jews
in Israel who hold this type of memory tend to reject peaceful resolution of
the conflict via the creation of two nations (Arian, 1995):
H1: The more central the collective memory among individuals, (a) the
stronger the fear related to personal and collective events will be and
(b) the weaker the hope related to personal and collective events.
Delegitimization
Delegitimization is defined as extremely negative social categorization of a
group (or groups) to the extent of excluding it from humanity as such, and
from the limits of acceptable norms or values. The delegitimized group is
viewed as violating basic human norms or values (Bar-Tal, 1990). It is a kind
of a moral exclusion, and those who are excluded are perceived as
non-entities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently, harming them
appears acceptable (Opotow, 1990). Intractable conflicts lead to mutual
delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 2007b), and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is no
exception (Bar-Tal, 1988; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). Focusing on Jewish-Israeli
society’s delegitimization of Arabs, Bar-Tal and Teichman’s (2005) extensive
analysis showed that as the conflict evolved and escalated, Arabs were per-
ceived more negatively as killers, blood-thirsty mobs, rioters, treacherous,
untrustworthy, cowardly, cruel, and wicked. This view became normative
in Israeli society, mainly until 1993 when the Oslo agreements were signed,
but it continues today (Bar-On, 2000; Kelman, 1999; Oren & Bar-Tal,
2007). Recently Halperin (2007) found that delegitimization of Arabs among
IsraeliJewswaspositivelycorrelatedwithemotionsoffear,hatred,andanger:
H2: The stronger the Israeli delegitimization of Arabs will be, the stronger
will be the Israelis’ fear related to personal and collective events and
the weaker the hope related to personal and collective events.
Personal Experiences
The research regardingpersonal experiences suggests thatlife events, whether
they are political (e.g., in the course of a conflict) or personal (e.g., an illness),
have a psychological impact on people’s emotions and behavior (Kaplan &
Damphousse,1997;Slone&Hallas,1999).Inthisstudy,werefertofourtypes
of personal experiences related to the Israeli–Arab conflict.
Holocaust. The first type of personal experience is related to indirectly
experienced traumatic events. In this study, we investigated the experience
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8of living with Holocaust survivors. Many of the survivors suffer chronic
anxiety, depressive reactions, insomnia, nightmares, somatization, anger,
and guilt (Erlich, 2002; Niederland, 1968). As a result, studies have shown
that the descendants of survivors suffer significantly due to their parents’
or grandparents’ horrible experiences in the Holocaust. They tend to display
mistrust, isolation, alienation and suspicion, feelings of helplessness, a fear
of abandonment or of catastrophes, depression, and anxiety (Davidson,
1980; Erlich, 2002):
H3: Close family relationships with a Holocaust survivor will be positively
related to fear and negatively to hope.
Terror attack. The second personal event is injury either of oneself or
the injury and death of a close relation in a terror attack conducted by
Arabs. This type of event should also be seen as a traumatic experience,
leading to psychological distress (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson,
2006). Deadly terror attacks have been a constant part of life in Israel.
Accompanying these experiences are often feelings of helplessness, pessi-
mism, insecurity, hate, depression, shame, and anxiety (Bleich, Gelkopf, &
Salomon, 2003; Derman & Cohen, 1990):
H4: Being injured oneself, or experiencing injury or death of a family mem-
ber in a terror attack, will increase fear on both the personal and the
collective levels and weaken hope related to both personal and collec-
tive events.
Army service. The third type of personal experience we consider in this
article is service in the Israeli army, in the occupied territories of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Soldiers who served in these areas, mainly since
the eruption of the first Intifada in 1987, are, on the one hand, exposed
to constant threat and danger from attacks by the Palestinians; and, on
the other hand, they may participate in or witness immoral Israeli conduct
and view Palestinian suffering (Gazit, 1999). Studies conducted in Israel
found that such service often leads to anti-Palestinian emotions, mistrust,
fear, hate, disgust, dehumanization, and prejudice (Dar, Kimhi, Stadler, &
Epstein, 2000; Gazit, 1999):
H5: Serving in the Israeli army in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will
increase both personal and collective fear and weaken hope.
Encounters with Arabs. The fourth type of personal experience is
contact with the rival (i.e., Arabs) through participation in organized
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8meetings aimed to enhance understanding and reconciliation between Israeli
Jews and Arabs (e.g., Maoz, 2004). Such meetings became common, mostly
after the Oslo accords, and were based on the contact hypothesis, which
claims that encounters between members of rival groups, when conducted
under certain conditions, ameliorate mutually held negative stereotypes,
attitudes, and emotions (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969). Studies that specifically
examined the impact of such meetings in the Israeli–Arab context generally
confirmed this assumption, with some limitations (e.g., the positive impact
wears off over time if additional supportive efforts are not made; Hertz-
Lazarowitz, 1989):
H6: Participation in organized encounters between Israeli Jews and Arabs
will be negatively related to personal and collective fear and positively
related to both types of hope.
Sociopolitical Characteristics
Three sociopolitical variables functioned as control variables in this
research: political orientation, religiosity, and education. These variables
are considered important in the general theoretical literature, as well as
being central in the specific context of the Israeli–Arab conflict.
Political Orientation
Israel’s political continuum stretches from a dovish pole characterized by
more trust in Arabs–Palestinians and readiness for concessions in exchange
for peace, to a hawkish pole characterized by deep mistrust of the world at
large and Arabs–Palestinians, more specifically, with no or minimal readi-
ness for concessions (Neuberger & Koffman, 1998).
Level of Religiosity
Jewish-Israel’s religious continuum has, on one hand, a secular pole and, on
the other, an ultra-orthodox one. Studies conducted in Israel found a close
correlation between political orientation and religiosity, indicating that
religious Jews tend to be much more hawkish and secular Jews more dovish
(Deshen, 1995; Peres, 1995). In addition, in comparison to secular Jews,
religious Jews hold more negative stereotypes of Israeli Arabs (Griffel,
Eisikovits, Fishman, & Grinstein-Weiss, 1997), are less willing to conduct
social relationships with Israeli Arabs, and are less willing to make terri-
torial concessions in exchange for peace.
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8Education
The final variable pertains to the level of formal education of the
respondents. There are some indications that level of education is positively
related with the readiness to compromise and resolve the conflict peacefully
(Arian, 1995).
METHOD
Participants and Procedures
In June 2000, a questionnaire was administered to 217 Israeli-Jewish under-
graduates from three academic institutions: (a) Tel-Aviv University
(N¼65), (b) Judea and Samaria Academic College (N¼88), and (c)
Or-Yehuda College (N¼64). The choice of these institutions was guided
by the fact that each of them has a concentration of students with different
political orientations.
1 Participation in the survey was voluntary, but
because respondents were approached during class, the response rates in
all three institutions were relatively high (around 85%). Before filling out
the questionnaires, the respondents were informed that they would be taking
part in an academic study that deals with perceptions and feelings about
certain events in Israeli society.
In general, the sample represented the distribution of the Israeli-Jewish
population with regard to gender, place of residence, immigration status,
political stand, and religiosity (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000). The mean
age of the respondents was 23.9 years (SD¼3.47). The proportion of men
was 50.2% (N¼109), and 15.2% (N¼32) were immigrants—mostly from
the former Soviet Union. In reference to their political stand, 45.4%
(N¼98) defined themselves as ‘‘rightist,’’ 25.5% (N¼55) as ‘‘centrist,’’ and
29.2% (N¼63) as ‘‘leftist.’’ When participants were asked to describe their
level of religiosity, 49.5% (N¼106) defined themselves as secular, 23%
(N¼50) as traditional, and 26.7% (N¼57) as religious or very religious.
Instruments
Respondents were asked to answer a structured questionnaire that assessed
emotional measures of personal and collective fear and hope, centrality of
1Tel Aviv University is mostly identified with the dovish political spectrum (‘‘left’’). Judea
and Samaria Academic College, which is located within the occupied territories (the city of
Ariel), is well known for its hawkish orientation (‘‘right’’). Most of the students in Or-Yehuda
College are of middle-to-low socioeconomic status and are religious.
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8Jewish collective memory, delegitimization of Arabs, family history (Holo-
caust survivors), life experiences (terror victim, meeting with Arabs, and
army service in the occupied territories), and sociopolitical information.
To control for order bias, one half of the questionnaires started with hope
scales and the other half with fear scales.
Dependent Variables
1. Personal and collective fear: Fear scales consisted of eight items: three for
personal fear and five for collective fear. All these questions began with
the following formulation: ‘‘On a scale of 1 (not at all)t o5( very much),
to what extent are you afraid of ... ?’’ The items reflected common
Israeli fears with regard to personal threats (e.g., ‘‘terror attack on a
bus, terror attack in a crowded place’’) and to collective threats (e.g.
‘‘military actions against Israel, widespread anti-Semitism, large-scale
terror attacks against Israel’’). The scales were constructed and validated
in a large-scale study reported in Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2006). The
distinctiveness of each of the subscales was confirmed by principal
component analysis that yielded two independent scales (collective vs.
personal fear) and, hence, lends construct validity to the measures used.
Both subscales yielded a satisfactory reliability: a¼.79 for personal fear
and a¼.78 for collective fear (Cronbach’s alpha).
2. Personal and collective hope: Hope scales were based on the conception
developed by Snyder (2000) and also consisted of eight items: three for
personal hope and five for collective hope. All hope questions started
with these initial words: ‘‘On a scale of 1 (not at all)t o5( very much),
to what extent do you hope that ...?’’ The items reflected the common
hopes of the Israeli public regarding a personal issue (e.g., ‘‘visiting
Damascus as a tourist’’) and a more collective one (e.g., ‘‘comprehensive
peace, cooperation with Arab countries, solution of the Jerusalem prob-
lem’’). The scales were constructed and validated in a large-scale study
also reported in Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2006). The distinctiveness of
each of the subscales was again confirmed by principal component analy-
sis that yielded two independent scales (collective vs. personal hope).
Both subscales yielded a satisfactory reliability: a¼.81 for personal hope
and a¼.82 for collective hope (Cronbach’s alpha).
Independent Variables
1. Jewish collective memory: To examine the centrality of Jewish collective
memory, it was essential to accurately define the components of that
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8memory. Hence, in a preliminary study we systematically analyzed
relevant passages in some of the pivotal history textbooks used in
Israeli schools. In addition, five in-depth interviews with Jewish-Israeli
students (aged 24–30) were conducted, asking them to provide a
detailed description of the way they perceive the main components of
the ‘‘Jewish-Israeli collective memory.’’ Data from both procedures
(i.e., history textbooks and interviews) were the basis for a scale
consisting of nine items. All questions began with the following
wording: ‘‘On a scale of 1 (not at all)t o5( very much), to what extent
do you find yourself thinking about issues related to the following
statements?’’ (e.g., ‘‘Throughout history, Jews continuously suffered
from anti-Semitism’’; ‘‘The existence of the Jewish people has been
under immediate danger throughout history’’; ‘‘The Jewish Holocaust
is the most important event in human history’’). The scale yielded a
satisfactory reliability of a¼.94 (Cronbach’s alpha).
2. Delegitimization of Arabs: The scale was aimed at measuring parti-
cipants’ perception of Arabs in delegitimizing terms (see Bar-Tal,
1989)—for example, as aggressive, inhuman, or as war mongers. It con-
sisted of five items. All items began with the following words: ‘‘On a scale
of 1 (not at all)t o5( very much), to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?’’ Each statement concentrated on a different
aspect of Arabs’ character (‘‘Arabs tend to be violent’’; ‘‘Arabs do not
care for human life’’; ‘‘Arabs are not to be trusted’’) or Arabs’ actions
(‘‘Most Arabs support terror’’; ‘‘Arabs consistently initiate violence
against Israel’’). The scale yielded a satisfactory reliability of a¼.84
(Cronbach’s alpha).
3. Life experiences: One dichotomous item examined participants’ personal
contact with Arab people: ‘‘Have you ever participated in an organized
meeting with Arabs?’’ (1¼no,2 ¼yes). A second dichotomous item
tapped participants’ army service: ‘‘Did you serve as a soldier in the
Occupied Territories?’’ (1¼no,2¼yes). A third dichotomous item exam-
ined participants’ relation to the Holocaust: ‘‘Are you second or third
generation to Holocaust survivors?’’ (1¼no,2¼yes). The fourth dichot-
omous item examined the participants’ personal exposure to terror
attacks: ‘‘Were you or any other member of your family ever hurt by
a terror attack?’’ (1¼no,2¼yes).
4. Sociopolitical variables: Sociopolitical variables included participants’
self-defined political stand (1¼extreme left to 7¼extreme right), self-
definition regarding religiosity (1¼secular,2¼traditional,3¼religious,
to 4¼ultra-orthodox), and level of education completed (1¼elementary
2¼high-school,3 ¼post-high school,4 ¼student,t o5 ¼academic
education).
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8RESULTS
Before presenting the advanced analysis, we display descriptive statistics for
the four main dependent variables and two of the independent ones
(Table 1). By and large, levels of collective fear (M¼3.77, SD¼0.74), as
well as the levels of collective hope (M¼4.22, SD¼0.88), are quite high.
Indeed, they are much higher than their personal equivalents (personal fear:
M¼2.86, SD¼1.01, t¼12.85, p < .001; personal hope: M¼3.31,
SD¼1.19, t¼11.58, p < .001).
2 Moreover, the standard deviations of all
four variables reveal that, although the participants’ responses with regard
to the collective emotions are relatively homogeneous, their responses
regarding personal emotions are much more diverse. Finally, the high levels
of both centrality of Jewish collective memory (M¼3.34, SD¼1.03) and
the delegitimization of Arabs (M¼3.47, SD¼.96) further emphasizes the
important role of those phenomena in Israeli society.
A correlation matrix of the research variables is presented in Table 2.
Results show that each of the personal emotions is positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with its collective equivalent. Nevertheless, in concurrence
with the factor analysis we already described (see the Method section), those
correlations are not too high (less than 0.7); and hence, although it appears
that the personal and the collective aspects of the same emotion (fear or
hope) are related, they are distinct phenomena.
With regard to the relations between independent and dependent vari-
ables, results show that collective memory is positively correlated with per-
sonal (r¼.18) and collective (r¼.47) fear but not with hope.
Delegitimization is positively correlated with both personal and collective
TABLE 1
Descriptive Characteristics—Main Research Variables
Variable Number of items n Range Reliability M SD
Personal fear 3 215 4.0 .79 2.86 1.01
Collective fear 5 216 3.4 .78 3.77 0.74
Personal hope 3 212 4.0 .81 3.31 1.19
Collective hope 5 214 4.0 .82 4.10 0.88
Collective memory 9 204 4.0 .94 3.34 1.03
Delegitimization 5 212 4.0 .84 3.47. 0.96
2It should be noted that the significant differences between the collective and the individual
aspects of each emotion could be a simple artifact of the specific items chosen. Yet, they might
also represent a real, substantial difference.
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8fear (r¼.24 and .52, respectively). It is negatively correlated with both per-
sonal and collective hope (r¼  .39 and –.33, respectively). As for the rela-
tions between personal experiences and emotions, surprisingly, second- and
third-generation post-Holocaust participants tend to display higher levels of
collective hope (r¼.16) than people not related to Holocaust victims. As
predicted, terror victims tend to present low levels of personal hope
(r¼ .14). In addition, army service in the territories seems to be negatively
related to the levels of personal fear (r¼  .29) and negatively related to the
levels of both personal (r¼  .25) and collective hope (r¼  .16).
Some of the sociopolitical variables are significantly correlated with fear
and hope. Hawkish political attitudes are positively related to collective fear
(r¼.49) and negatively related to both collective (r¼  .33) and personal
hope (r¼  .38). No significant correlation was found between political
orientation and personal fear. Level of religiosity is positively related to per-
sonal fear (r¼.14) but negatively related to collective fear (r¼  .21). In
addition, it is positively related to both personal (r¼.23) and collective hope
(r¼.16). Finally, level of education is significantly (negatively) related only
to the level of personal fear (r¼  .27).
In the next stage, two steps of multiple regression analysis were conduc-
ted to examine research hypotheses that refer to collective and personal fear.
In the first step, to examine the relations between the independent variables
and each of the two types of fear while controlling for the impact of other
variables, collective and personal fear were regressed on all the independent
variables.
Table 3 shows that above and beyond the distinct influence of each of the
independent variables on each emotion, the explanatory capability of the
independent variables is much higher in the case of collective fear than in
the case of its personal counterpart. The first steps of the regression of per-
sonal and collective fear partially confirm Hypothesis 1: The stronger a per-
son’s Jewish collective memory, the higher her or his feeling of collective but
not personal fear; confirm Hypothesis 2: Delegitimization of Arabs is the
most significant predictor of both types of fear; oppose Hypotheses 3 to
6: (a) Family experience of the Holocaust is negatively related to levels of
collective fear, (b) ‘‘army service’’ in the territories lowers the levels of per-
sonal fear, and (c) life experiences like being a terror victim or meeting with
Arabs has no significant direct relations with either type of fear. Finally,
some sociopolitical variables influence levels of fear: (a) rightist political
orientation is closely related to collective fear, and (b) low level of education
is related to personal fear.
In the second step, to examine potential joint influences of collective
memory and other independent variables on each of the emotions, all poss-
ible interaction effects between the two clusters of emotions were examined.
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8Only significant interaction effects were entered into the analysis. Although
no interaction effect between collective memory and other independent vari-
ables was found to be significant in reference to personal fear, the interac-
tion of collective memory with meeting Arabs is positive and significant
with regard to collective fear.
To reveal the nature of the interaction effect, we plotted an interaction
graph while controlling for other predictors that were entered into the
regression equation. As seen in Figure 1, the direction of relations between
meetings with Arabs and collective fear is totally different for individuals
with high and low levels of Jewish collective memory. Whereas for the first
group the encounters with Arabs are closely related to higher levels of col-
lective fear, for the second group they are related to lower levels of collective
fear. It seems, hence, that it is not the contact with Arabs as such that
directly influences collective fear, but that it is moderated by the collective
memory a person brings to the meeting.
Next, two steps of multiple regression analysis were conducted to predict
personal and collective hope. In the first step (Table 4), the direct relations
between the independent variables and personal and collective hope were
examined. Contrary to the findings presented in Table 3, the first steps in
Table 4 show that the explanatory power of the independent variables is
TABLE 3
Two Steps of Hierarchical Linear Regressions with Interaction Predicting Personal and
Collective Fear
Collective fear Personal fear
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1
Variable B SE B SE B SE
Collective memory .22    .05 –.24 .16 .06 .08
Delegitimization .19   .06 .17   .06 .29   .10
Holocaust survivors –.22  .09 –.19  .09 –.05 .15
Terror victim .08 .24 .12 .24 –.38 .42
Meeting with Arabs –.11 .15 –.56   .50 –.22 .24
Service in territories .03 .09 .01 .09 –.45   .15
Political orientation (þright) .14    .04 .15    .04 –.09 .06
Level of religiosity .03 .06 .04 .05 .14 .09
Education .03 .02 .02 .02 –.07  .04
Collective memory meeting with Arabs .43   .14
R
2 (adjusted) .43 .41 .46 .43 .22 .18
Note. Cells contain unstandardized parameter estimates. Figures in bold are significant
coefficients.
 p < .05.   p < .01.    p < .001.
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8significantly higher regarding personal hope than regarding collective hope.
It is interesting to note that the results reveal many similarities between the
predictors of personal and collective hope. In more detail, contrary to
Hypothesis 1, no significant relations were found between collective memory
and hope (personal or collective). On the other hand, as in the case of the
fear predictors, delegitimization of Arabs was found to be the most influen-
tial predictor of both personal and collective hope (Hypothesis 2). Yet, this
time the direction is opposite—the higher the levels of delegitimization, the
lower the personal and collective hope. Surprisingly, and contrary to
Hypothesis 3, no significant relations were found between the family experi-
ence of living with Holocaust survivors and levels of hope. In addition,
although meeting with Arabs and family relationships with terror victims
was found to be negatively related to the personal sense of hope, it has no
relations at all to the collective level (partial confirmation of Hypotheses
4 and 6). On the other hand, in concurrence with Hypothesis 5, army service
in the occupied territories is significantly related to lower levels of personal
and collective hope. Finally, results show that rightist political views are
related to low levels of both personal and collective hope.
One of our most basic hypotheses was that understanding personal and
collective hope through the prism of life events and attitudes toward Arabs
would work differently for individuals with different levels of centrality of
collective memory. Hence, in the second step, we divided the entire sample
into two groups—those with a high sense of collective memory versus those
FIGURE 1 The effect of the interaction between collective memory and meeting with Arabs
on collective fear (controlling for other independent variables).
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8with a low sense of collective memory.
3 The division was made by the
median score and produced two almost equally sized groups—high central-
ity (N¼107) and low centrality (N¼97). Next, separate multiple regression
analyses were conducted for each group to predict personal and collective
hope.
In general, the results of the second steps in Table 4 show that, despite the
fact that collective memory has no direct relation with personal or collective
hope, its indirect effect is broad. More specifically, the results show that for
individuals who define the collective memory as central, only delegitimiza-
tion of the rival is significantly (positively) related to the levels of personal
and collective hope. On the other hand, in addition to the significant influ-
ence of delegitimization, for those for whom collective memory is low, levels
of both types of hope are negatively related to hawkish political orientation
and to army service in the territories. In addition, personal hope is exclus-
ively and negatively related to contact with Arabs and to family relation-
ships with a terror victim.
DISCUSSION
Many researchers of intractable conflict recognize and write about the role
of emotions (e.g., Petersen, 2002; White, 1996), but the empirical work on its
antecedents, functions, and consequences is in its initial stages. This research
makes a modest
4 contribution to the study of emotions in intractable con-
flict by elucidating some of the antecedents of two major emotions—fear
and hope—in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Specifically, it focused
on the interrelations between fear and hope with three categories of vari-
ables: collective memory, delegitimization of the rival, and traumatic per-
sonal experience related to conflict.
First of all, the results show that individuals differentiate between emo-
tions (fear and hope) that are related to personal experiences and emotions
that are related to collective experiences. Moreover, different factors are
3It should be stressed that the split into high and low collective memory is for illustrative
purposes only. In practice, this procedure enabled a deeper look into the interaction effects
of various independent variables and collective memory on both types of hope. Despite some
advantages of other methods to present interaction effects, we found the one used here as
the most parsimonious as well as the most suitable for the needs of these analyses.
4We define the contribution of this work as ‘‘modest,’’ mainly due to the correlative nature
of the study and its non-comparative or local nature. Yet, we believe that the preliminary find-
ings of this work can create a fertile ground for an in-depth line of studies on similar or related
issues that will overcome the aforementioned limitations.
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8differently related to each of them. This means that individuals assess
experiences that elicit personal fear and hope unlike experiences that elicit
collective fear and hope. Similar results with regard to personal and collec-
tive threat were found by Huddy et al. (2002). In addition, explanatory fac-
tors that are related to the conflict, like the ones tested in this work, were
found to be more related to fear on the collective level and to hope on
the personal one. Their relation with collective hope and personal fear is
much more limited. Hence, it can be argued that the psychological context
of the conflict, as expressed through our independent variables, is more clo-
sely related to personal and not collective experience of hope and to collec-
tive and not personal experience of fear.
Second, the results indicate that the level of collective fear and hope is
higher than the level of personal fear and hope. This means that the parti-
cipants in the study were more affected emotionally by possible collective
experiences than by personal experiences. Those results correspond with
previous publications that stressed the intensity of the collective emotional
experiences of members of societies that are involved in intractable conflict
(Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Volkan, 1997).
With regard to analyses of the determinants, not surprisingly, delegitimi-
zation was found to be closely related to both fear and hope. The more dele-
gitimized the rival, the greater the personal and collective fear and the less
the personal and collective hope. Delegitimization includes not only nega-
tive stereotyping but denied humanity (Bar-Tal, 1990). In our case, Arabs
have been stereotyped with the most negative, threatening labels, which
not surprisingly lead to fear on personal and collective levels and decreased
hope for peace on both levels as well.
Collective memory was found to be another important correlate of fear,
but it had direct relations only with fear related to collective experiences.
Individuals who tend to remember the very negative experiences of the
Jewish people tend also to experience fear about the future of the Jewish
collective. This finding is of special importance because it shows that
remembering traumatic Jewish experiences that took place in the distant
past affects collective fear related to the Israeli-Arab conflict. It confirms
longstanding observations by a number of social scientists and historians
who suggest that remembrance of the distant Jewish past, and especially
the Holocaust experience as actively propagated and fostered in Israel, feeds
into Israeli citizens’ fear of Arabs (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Segev, 2000; Zertal,
2005).
Moreover, in addition to the direct relation of collective memory to col-
lective fear, it was found to have a combined (interaction) effect on fear with
personal contact with Arabs. The results indicate that collective memory
highly influences the results of interethnic meetings. For those who have
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8high levels of collective memory, the meetings triggered feelings of collective
fear. This suggests that for them an Arab serves as a generalized negative
stimulus who elicits memories of past persecution. On the other hand, it
appears that for people who are less flooded by traumatic national memor-
ies, interaction with Arabs has actually managed to reduce perception of
collective threat and feelings of fear.
Rather surprisingly, we did not find any direct associations between the
centrality of collective memory and both types of hope. Yet, the results
point to a very unique role played by collective memory in the develop-
ment of hope. It seems that levels of collective and personal hope are
affected by life experiences and political orientation only among indivi-
duals for whom the collective memory is not a pivotal part of their life.
On the other hand, individuals who are dominated by a central sense of
collective memory are more resistant to changes in levels of hope, and this
in turn is affected only by the perceptions of the rival (delegitimization).
Hence, high levels of collective memory serve as barriers that blur any
potential effect of important life experiences on emotions that are related
to the conflict.
As for direct effect of life events, meetings with Arabs affected neither
fear nor hope on the collective level. It seems that individuals who live with
a long-term conflict tend to differentiate between sporadic positive interac-
tions with individuals from the out-group and their deep-rooted collective
feelings related to the longstanding rival out-group as a whole (Halperin,
2007). On the personal level, participation in meetings with Arabs was
related to low levels of hope. Studies that investigated organized Jewish-
Arab encounters have very often reported that Jewish participants were
greatly surprised with the strong feelings and far-reaching demands for
change expressed by the Arab participants (Hertz-Lazarowitz, Zelniker,
Stephan, & Stephan, 2004). We assume that the high level of grievance
and demand that emerge in some of those meetings on the part of the Arab
group members negatively affect the personal optimism and hope of the
Israeli group members.
The results also show that the experience of living with a family member
who survived the Holocaust is negatively related to collective fear. This is a
somewhat surprising result because it is generally assumed that the second
generation of Holocaust survivors are prone to more anxiety and fear,
although there is also a line of research that shows more complex results
(van Ijzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Sagi-Schwartz, 2003). Accord-
ing to this line of research, the experience of living beyond the Holocaust
can be seen in some cases as increasing resilience. It is possible that, in
our case, the participants who lived with Holocaust survivors became more
resilient in response to possible threatening events.
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8Army service in the occupied territories turned out to be negatively
related to personal fear, meaning that those who served there experienced
less personal fear. On the other hand, this population also experienced less
personal and collective hope. It is possible that the contact with the Palesti-
nians strengthened and inoculated the soldiers against fear but also showed
them that achieving peace is very difficult and may even be unrealistic;
therefore, the hope was reduced. It is also possible that this long, stressful,
and eroding experience reduced the soldiers’ sensitivity to any kind of emo-
tions (positive or negative) that are related to the conflict.
Being hurt by terror or having a family member hurt by it decreased the
level of both personal and collective hope. It is documented that victims
of terror tend to exhibit hawkish views and object to peace negotiations
(Bar-Tal, 2007a). Yet, of no less interest is the finding according to which
no significant relations were found between personal experience with terror
attacks and personal or collective fear. This can be explained, to some
extent, by resilience factors or by the gain in coping resources that in some
situations evolve among war veterans and victims of terror attacks (Hobfoll
et al., 2006).
In general, the findings show that perceptions of the rival, collective
memory, and life experiences join together to affect different aspects of fear
and hope in the context of conflict. Scholars of emotions (Frijda, 1986;
Lazarus, 1994) usually refer to events and cognitive appraisals as the most
central antecedents of emotions. The findings of this work confirm this
but suggest that the conflict situation should be viewed as a unique context
in which events are evaluated through the prism of memory and with refer-
ence to prevalent, socially construed, and circulated perceptions of the rival.
This line of study is of special importance because fear and hope play a
major role in the psyche of society members, thus determining people’s
behavior to a large extent. Fear sensitizes people to threatening cues, causes
overestimation of danger, adherence to known situations, and avoidance of
uncertain ones (Bar-Tal, 2001; Clore et al., 1994; LeDoux, 1995). It also
mobilizes society members to act on behalf of society to cope with the
threat, to act against the enemy, and defend their country. Fear thus tends
to limit society members’ perspective by binding the present to past experi-
ences related to the conflict, and by building expectations for the future
exclusively on the basis of the past. Society members then have difficulty
freeing themselves from the domination of fear to construct hope for peace.
Hope for peace includes a yearning for relief from the terrible situation of
intractable conflict and the active wish for conflict resolution. It is based on
realistic and concrete goals and enables the generation of pragmatic ways to
achieve such goals. Hope liberates people from fixed—and fixating—beliefs
about the irreconcilability of the conflict to find creative ways to resolve it.
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8It enables them to imagine a future that is different from the past and
present and motivates them to change their situation by means of actions
that were long unthinkable such as negotiating with the enemy, making
compromises, seeing the enemy as human beings who are also victims of
the conflict, and so on. Without hope for peace, it is impossible to success-
fully embark on the road to peace.
In sum, this study sheds light on some of the determinants of collective
and personal fear and hope, suggesting the importance of collective mem-
ory, delegitimization of the rival, and personal experiences. Additional
research could examine potential ways to moderate the impact of memory
and negative perceptions of the rival, on present feelings, and decision-
making processes concerning peace and war.
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